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TRUTH, JUSTICE AND
RECONCILIATION COMMISSION
Promoting Peace, Justice, National Unity, Dignity, Healing and Reconciliation Among The People of Kenya
INTRODUCTION 
The Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC or the 
Commission) was established in the wake of the tragic events of 
the 2007/2008 Post-Election Violence (PEV).
The Commission has produced its Report as the culmination of 
a process that lasted four years and took the Commission to all 
regions of the country. 
The violence, bloodshed and destruction of the PEV shocked 
Kenyans into the realisation that their nation, long considered 
an island of peace and tranquillity, remained deeply divided 
since independence from British colonial rule in December 
1963. It prompted a fresh opportunity for the country to examine 
the negative practices of the past four and half decades that 
contributed to a state that still holds sway in Kenya: normalization 
and institutionalization of gross violation of human rights, abuse of 
power and misuse of public office.
In the aftermath of the 2007/2008 PEV, the Kenya National Dialogue 
and Reconciliation (KNDR) process resulted in the adoption of 
among others, the Agreement on the Principles of Partnership of 
the Coalition Government (Coalition Agreement) on the basis of 
which, the National Assembly enacted the National Accord and 
Reconciliation Act on 18 March 2008. The National Accord paved 
the way for the establishment of a coalition government with a 
President, Prime Minister and two Deputy Prime Ministers. 
As part of the KNDR process, an agreement for the establishment 
of a truth, justice and reconciliation commission (TJRC Agreement) 
was also adopted. Pursuant to the TJRC Agreement, the National 
Assembly enacted the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Act (TJR 
Act) on 23 October 2008. The Act received Presidential Assent on 
28 November 2008 and came into operation on 17 March 2009.
In terms of the TJR Act, the Commission was inaugurated on 3 
August 2009.The broad mandate of the Commission was to inquire 
into gross violation of human rights and historical injustices that 
occurred in Kenya from 12 December 1963 when Kenya became 
independent to 28 February 2008 when  the Coalition Agreement 
was signed
METHODOLOGY AND PROCESS 
The work of the Commission was structured into four mutual and 
overlapping phases:  statement-taking, research and investigations, 
hearings and report writing. Civic education was conducted 
alongside these activities. 
Statement taking: The Commission designed a Statement Form 
to capture information from witnesses. The Statement Form was 
designed to ensure the gathering of as much information as 
possible about gross violations of human rights. The Commission 
undertook an initial statement taking exercise in Mt Elgon in May 
and June 2010. This was a pilot project which the Commission 
used to get feedback from victims and other witnesses about the 
statement-taking methodology, including the Statement Form. The 
nation-wide statement taking exercise was officially launched on 
9 September 2010 and lasted five months. It was anticipated that 
some individuals would be unwilling or unable to record statements 
during the formal statement taking exercise and so the Commission, 
continued to record and receive statements and memoranda at its 
offices and during individual and thematic hearings. 
A special Children’s Statement-Taking Form was also prepared in 
consultation with child protection agencies and was pre-tested in 
October 2011 to assess its suitability and effectiveness in taking 
statements from children. The draft was subsequently revised 
to incorporate insights from the pre-testing exercise. Statement 
takers were then guided on the use of the Children’s Statement 
Form before they were deployed to take statements from children 
for a period of one month. A total of 996 statements were collected 
from children:  500 from boys and 496 from girls.  On the basis 
of these statements, the Commission subsequently organised a 
thematic hearing for children in December 2011, details of which 
are discussed later in this Chapter.
REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION
Research and investigations: 
the Commission established an Investigation Department whih 
was responsible for identifying and interviewing witnesses whose 
individual stories would contribute to the historical narrative 
of gross violations of human rights in the country. The role of 
the Department also extended to the collection and analysis of 
relevant documentary and other forms of evidence. Investigations 
were conducted in three main phases: before, during and after the 
hearings.
Hearings: The Commission started its hearings in mid-April 2011 
in Garissa and concluded at the beginning of April 2012 in Nairobi. 
The Commission conducted three kinds of hearings: individual 
hearings, women’s hearings and thematic hearings. 
Individual hearings focused on the experience of individuals in 
relation to gross violation of human rights. Testimony was heard 
from individuals whose rights had been violated, as well as from 
those who either had knowledge of or allegedly participated in acts 
that resulted in the violations. 
Women’s hearings were exclusively attended by women. The 
hearings were framed as ‘conversations with women’. They were 
designed to and were  safe spaces where women could freely talk 
about violations that were specific to them. thematic hearings that 
focused on specific violations, events, or groups of victims. 
Thematic hearings were meant to elicit public testimony on specific 
themes that are of particular importance in Kenya’s pursuit for 
truth, justice and reconciliation. The Commission held a total of 14 
thematic hearings focusing on diverse subjects. 
Report writing: The final product of the Commission is a Report 
which was compiled in terms of section 5(j) and 48(2) of the TJR 
Act. These sections essentially tasked the Commission to compile 
a report providing as comprehensive as possible an account of its 
activities and findings together with recommendations on measures 
to prevent the future occurrence of violations. Details of the Report 
are provided below. 
THE REPORT
The Report is structured into four volumes: 
Volume I provides an account of how the Commission was formed, 
how it interpreted its mandate and conducted its work, and the 
challenges it faced in carrying out its mandate. 
Volume II is further divided into three sub-volumes. Volume IIA 
focuses on the major violations of bodily integrity rights that were 
committed during the Commission’s mandate period. These are: 
unlawful killings and enforced disappearances (that is, massacres, 
extra-judiial killings, and political assassinations); unlawful 
detentions, torture and ill-treatment; and sexual violence. While 
much of this volume is focused on violations directly committed by 
the state, it also includes descriptions of killings, severe injury and 
violence, sexual violence, detention, and other similar violations 
committed by non-state actors.  
Volume IIB focuses on some of the unique parts of the Commission’s 
mandate concerning historical injustices in Kenya. The volume has 
three chapters: land and conflict; economic marginalization and 
violation of socio-economic rights; and economic crimes and grand 
corruption.
Volume IIC focuses on the stories and narratives of groups 
of people that are provided special protection under domestic 
and international law because of a history of discrimination 
and oppression. These are: women, children and minority and 
indigenous people. Historically members of these groups were not 
recognized as having the same rights as others. The Commission 
established a Special Support Unit that focused on, among other 
things, ensuring that the Commission’s activities adequately 
addressed and were accessible to historically vulnerable groups. 
The Commission also held thematic hearings that focused not only 
on the plight and rights of the aforementioned three groups but also 
the experiences of persons with disabilities (PWDs). Indeed, the 
Commission did put into place specific procedures in its statement 
taking exercise and public hearings to accommodate persons with 
disabilities. The experiences of PWDs are reflected across the 
various Chapters of this Volume.   
Volume III focuses on issues relating to national unity and 
reconciliation in Kenya. The Commission was mandated to inquire 
into the causes of ethnic tension and make recommendations on 
the promotion of healing, reconciliation and coexistence among 
ethnic communities.
The final volume of the Report - Volume IV - provides a catalogue 
of the findings and recommendations of the Commission. Included 
in this volume is the Commission’s recommendation relating to the 
implementation mechanism and reparation framework. 
THEMATIC OVERVIEWS 
Political History: A general outline
In order to contextualise gross violations of human rights and 
historical injustices that occurred during the mandate period, 
the Commission divided the political history of Kenya into four 
distinct epochs. These epochs correspond with the four political 
administrations that governed the country prior to and during the 
Commission’s mandate period: 
• British colonial era (1895 to 1963); 
• President Jomo Kenyatta’s era (1963 to 1978); 
• President Daniel arap Moi’s era (1978 to 2002); and 
• President Mwai Kibaki’s era (2002 to 2008). 
A review of the colonial period by the Commission revealed a litany 
of offences and atrocities commited by the British administration 
against the people now known as Kenyans. These violations 
included massacres, torture, arbitary detention, and sexual 
violence, most of which were committed, initially, when the British 
government forced its authority on the local population, and later, 
when it violently sought to quash the Mau Mau rebellion. From 1952 
onwards, the British administration established detention camps in 
which suspected members of Mau Mau and/or their sympathisers 
were tortured and ill-treated. Others were detained in restricted 
villages where they were used as forced labour under harsh and 
inhuman or degrading conditions.The colonial government was 
also responsible for massive displacement of thousands of people 
from their lands. More than 2 million hectares of land were taken 
away from the original inhabitants. This displacement created the 
conflicts over land that remain the cause and driver of conflict and 
ethnic tension in Kenya today. 
On 12 December 1963, Kenya gained independence from British 
rule. Independence came with high expectations and hopes. It 
signaled an end to practices that had been institutionalised under 
British rule; the end of racial segregation, detention camps, torture, 
massacres, unlawful killings and similar practices that had been 
institutionalised under colonialism. To the citizens of a new free 
nation, independence meant the return to lands from which they 
had been forcibly evicted and of which they had been dispossessed 
in order to pave the way for British settlers. It was supposed to be 
the beginning of political and economic emancipation; the start of 
respect for the rule of law, human rights and dignity and the laying 
down of the foundations and tenets of democracy. Many envisioned 
a newly invigorated, united nation.
These expectations never materialized. President Kenyatta made 
no substantial changes to the structure of the state. Nor did he 
commit to or put in place mechanisms to redress the land probems 
that had been created by the colonial administration. Instead, 
President Kenyatta embarked on consolidating his power. Under 
his administration, any political dissent was met with quick rebuke 
and reprisals in effect forcing the populace into a silence of fear. 
Reprisals included harassment,various forms of intimidation, 
attacks on the person, detention and even assassination. Many fled 
into exile for fear of their lives and to avoid the heavy hand of the 
Kenyatta administration. It was also during President Kenyatta’s 
administration that Kenya waged a war in northern Kenya to quash 
a desire by residents of this region to secede to Somalia. This war 
has come to be popularly known as the ‘Shifta War’. State security 
agencies committed various forms of atrocities durign the Shifta 
War and the Commission has dedicated a chapter in this Report 
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that documents those atrocities. 
Under President Moi the status quo remained for a couple of 
years before becoming notably worse after the coup attempt of 1 
August 1982. In the aftermath of the coup, members of the Kenya 
Air Force were rounded up and transported to prison facilities and 
other locations where they were tortured and subjected to inhuman 
and degrading treatment. 
Thereafter, President Moi stepped up measures aimed at controlling 
the state and further consolidating his power. He filled government 
positions with loyalists, mainly from his own Kalenjin community. His 
government, which had in June 1982, amended the constitution to 
make Kenya a de jure one party state, removed security of tenure 
for constitutional office holders such as judges. The patterns of 
violence that started under Kenyatta continued under President 
Moi’s administration. Notably, members of state security agencies 
routinely commited atrocities against a people they had sworn to 
ptotect. Security operations, particularly in Northern Kenya often 
resulted in the massacres of innocent citizens. Almost without 
exception, security operations entailed the following atrocities: 
torture and ill-treatment, rape and sexual violence, looting of 
property and burning of houses. These systematic attacks against 
civilians have all of the attributes of a crime against humanity.  
When movements arose to advocate for opening up of the 
democtatic space and respect for human rights, President Moi’s 
government unleashed a reign of terror. Between 1986 and 1997, 
hundreds of individuals were detained and tortured because 
they were suspected to be members of illegal organizations. The 
infamous Nyayo House torture chambers were designed and built 
during this period specifically for the purpose of terrorizing those 
who were critical of, or perceived to be critical of, the established 
regime.  
In 1991, in response to local and international pressure prompted 
by the end of the Cold War, President Moi yielded to demands for 
a multi-party state. However, with the advent of multi-party politics, 
elections began to be identified with violence. Ethnicity became 
an even more potent tool for political organising and access 
to state resources. Like his predecessor, President Moi lacked 
the commitment to address grievances related to land. Instead, 
irregular and illegal allocation of land became rampant during his 
era in power. 
In December 2002, KANU was dislodged from power by NARC 
under the leadership of President Mwai Kibaki. As a political party, 
NARC came to power on a platform that promised to curb and 
ultimately eliminate the political transgressions and human rights 
violations that had become so common during the 39 years of 
KANU’s rule. NARC also pledged to address and rectify historical 
injustices.True to its commitment and in response to concerted 
calls by political activists and civil society organisations (CSOs) 
in the first few months of attaining power, the NARC government 
initiated numerous legislative and institutional reforms and a range 
of activities aimed at redressing past injustices. 
However, it was not long before autocratic tendencies and KANU-
like practices began to emerge in the Kibaki administration. An 
informal clique of powerful individuals who were keen on promoting 
narrow and regional interests formed around the President. Like 
President Moi before him, President Kibaki purged the public 
service of his predecessor’s nominees and filled it with people 
from his Kikuyu community and the larger GEMA community. The 
administration paid lip service to the struggle against corruption. 
In 2005, all pretensions by the  Kibaki administration that it was 
pursuing reforms and a transitional agenda faded after the rejection 
of the Proposed New Constitution of Kenya in 2005 by the majority 
of Kenyans. 
The period leading up to the 2007 General Election was 
characterised by intense violent activities by militia groups, 
especially the Mungiki sect and Sabaot Land Defence Force 
(SLDF).The government responded to the violence with excessive 
force. In effect, the General Elections of 27 December 2007 were 
conducted in a volatile environment in which violence had been 
normalised and ethnic relations had become poisoned. Fertile 
ground had been prepared for the eruption of violence. Therefore, 
when the results of the Presidential Election were disputed, and 
both PNU and ODM claimed victory, violence erupted. 
The scale of the post-election violence (PEV) was unprecedented. 
It lasted for a period of two months and subsantially affected all but 
two provinces in the country. It is estimated that 1,133 people were 
killed, thousands assaulted and raped, hundreds of thousands 
more displaced from their homes, and property worth billions of 
shillings destroyed. It was one of the darkest episodes in Kenya’s 
post-independence history
 
Security Agencies: The police and the 
military   
The police and the military forces are at the centre of Kenya’s 
history of gross violations of human rights. While other agencies 
of the state were responsible for historical injustices and gross 
violations of human rights during the mandate period, security 
agencies were both primarily responsible for many of the acts 
of commission documented in this Report, as well as the acts of 
omission (the failure to provide security) that allowed many of the 
violations committed by non-state actors to occur.  
Across the country, the Commission heard horrendous accounts of 
atrocities committed against innocent citizens by the police and the 
military. The history of security operations conducted by these two 
institutions, either jointly or severally, is dominated by tales of brutal 
use of force, unlawful killings (sometimes on a large scale), rape 
and sexual violence, and burning and looting of property. In security 
operations, the police and the military often employed collective 
punishment: the indiscriminate rounding up of individuals in a 
specific area, then brutally punishing them, all with the expectation 
that this would yield the desired results of increased security. Thus, 
since independence, the police and the military in Kenya have 
been viewed and invariably described as rogue institutions; they 
are still feared and seen as perennial violators of human rights 
rather than protectors of the same. 
NYAYO HOUSE TORTURE VICTIMS NAME ON WALL
In this regard, the Commission sought to trace the origins 
of practices employed by security agencies during security 
operations. What emerged is that the practices adopted by the 
police and military forces in independent Kenya are starkly similar 
to those employed by the same forces during the colonial period. 
In essence, Independent Kenya inherited a police force that was 
deeply and historically troubled. From the 1890s right through to 
the late 1950s and early 1960s, the Kenya police force clearly 
structured itself around the policing needs of a small and politically 
powerful elite and racial minority. Kenya’s police force was from 
the outset built to cater to these privileged few.  When, however, 
the Kenya Police Force did encounter African populations it was 
with a force and devastating violence. Throughout the temporal 
period of the Commission’s mandate this resort to brutality by the 
security agencies never changed. The police force remained a 
law unto itself. The Kenya Police Force of today largely resembles 
the Kenya Police Force of the colonial period: narrow in outlook, 
unclear in mission and violent in tendency. 
The history of the military paints a similarly grim picture. During the 
colonial period, and especially during the emergency period, the 
military was engaged in the screening and interrogating of people 
in order to extract information from them concerning Mau Mau. It 
is from these twin processes of screening and interrogation that 
the most astonishing evidence of widespread and institutionalized 
torture has emerged. The military would continue to use similar 
brutal tactics way into the post-independence era and as recently 
as March 2008 during Operation Okoa Maisha in Mt. Elgon.
Shifta war
The Shifta War, waged between 1964 to 1967, represents a 
period in Kenya’s history during which systematic and widespread 
violation of human rights (including mass killings) of Kenyan 
citizens occured. Officially, the death toll stands at 2,000. Unofficial 
estimates place the death toll at 7,000. The Shifta War acts as 
a bridge from the violations committed by the colonial power 
prior to independence and the violations committed by the newly 
independent government. The War arose out of a long history of 
political unrest in Northern Kenya where ethnic groups resisted 
centralised colonial rule. After independence state security agents 
alongside military personnel were deployed in what was called the 
Northern Frontier District to quell the continuing resistance.
Witness testimonies before the Commission brought to the surface 
the long history of violation of human rights and related activities 
in Northern Kenya. From the colonial days, Northern Kenya had 
been administered differently from the rest of the country. Travel 
and movement restrictions were imposed and administrators were 
given extraordinary powers to arrest and detain members of what 
the state referred to as ‘hostile tribes’.
The Commission did not get much information about the war 
itself because of the secrecy around military operations and 
the government’s reluctance to provide the information in its 
possession. However, individuals and communities affected by 
the war submitted memoranda and information to the Commission 
which enabled it to set out the broad characteristisc of the war. The 
Commission established that the Shifta War was characterised by 
unimagineable brutality committed by state security agents, mainly 
the Kenya Army. Mass killings featured prominently in the witness 
testimonies and narratives. Pastoralist communities lost almost 
90 percent of their livestock through heavy handed strategies in 
which livestock were shot dead or confiscated. Many residents 
of the region trace the high levels of poverty experienced by 
communities of Northen Kenya to the excesses of the Shifta 
War. 
Women narrated horrible stories of rape and other forms of 
sexual violence and the military and police were reported as 
major perpetrators. The Commission aslo received tetsimony 
pointing to the fact that women were held as sexual slaves by 
state security agencies during the War. As a result of the War, 
some communities fled to Somalia to escape the violence and 
only returned decades later, in 2000.
As part of the Shifta War, the Kenyan government established 
restricted or protected villages in which residents of Northern 
Kenya were essentially detained and their movement severely 
restricted. This villagisation pprogramme was eerily reminiscent 
of the detention camps created during the colonial period. The 
conditions in these villages were squalid and diseases such as 
dysentry and tuberculosis were common. 
The signing of a Memorandum of Understanding in Arusha, Tanzania 
on 28 October 1967 between the governments of Kenya and 
Somalia marked the formal end of the war. Witnesses complained 
that they had no idea what was decided during the bilateral 
negotiations between the Somali and Kenyan governments as the 
contents of the agreement were never revealed to the people of the 
Northern Kenya, including the citizens residing in the north.
The Commission found that the Kenyan government made a 
deliberate effort to cover up abuses committed in connection with 
the Shifta War, and enacted the Indemnity Act in order to protect 
government officials for accountability for wrongful acts committed 
during the conflict. As such, the Commission has recommended 
the repeal of the Indemnity Act within nine months of the issuance 
of its Report. The Commission has also recommended that the 
Arusha Agreement be made public and be widely disseminated 
in Northern Kenya.  Further, the Commission has recommended 
reparation for victims of Shifta War and the establishment of a 
public memorial to commemorate the victims of the War. 
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Massacres
The history of massacres in Kenya predates colonialism in Kenya. 
There were inter and intra-ethnic killings, as illustrated by the 
the Maasai wars of the 1800s. This was the context in which the 
colonialists entered the scene and opened fresh horizons for mass 
violence.
The Commission studied the history of 
massacres in Kenya to identify broad 
trends and patterns of mass violence that 
have recurred throughout Kenya’s history. 
The first properly documented massacre 
in Kenya’s colonial past was the Kedong 
Massacre of 26 November 1895. Other 
massacres include those committed in 
the context of the Giriama Rebellion of 
1912-1914,  and the Kollowa Massacre 
of 24 April 1950. Other massacres were 
committed during the Mau Mau uprising 
between 1952 and 1959. In this regard, 
the Lari and Hola Massacres stand out. 
In all these massacres, the colonial state 
was present and was always unapologetic. 
Indeed, the colonial state always tried to 
minimise, cover up or flatly deny the 
occurrence of such mass killings.
At independence, the country was blood-
drenched with a history of massacres and 
entered its future with historical baggage 
that was to affect future events. The 
Commission’s research, investigations and 
hearings revealed that most massacres in 
Kenya have occured in Northern Kenya 
and have always occured in the context of 
what the state refers to security operations. The Commission has 
documented the following massacres committed by state security 
agents: Bulla Karatasi Massacre; Wagalla Massacre; Malka Mari 
Massacre; and Lotirir Massacre. To date, no government official 
has been prosecuted or otherwise publicly held to account for 
these atrocities. The Commission also focused on a few massacres 
committed by non-state actors: Turbi Massacre, Murkutwa 
Massacre, and Loteteleit Massacre. The primary findings of the 
Commission in relation to the 
Bulla Karatasi Massacre: 
The Commission found that the security operation conducted in 
Garissa in November 1980 resulted in the massacre of hundreds 
of civilians. Numerous other atrocities were committed by state 
security agents including torture, brutal beatings, rape and sexual 
violence, burning of houses and looting of property. The Commission 
found that the atrocities committed 
during the security operation qualified as 
crimes against humanity. Moreover, the 
Commission found that the North Eastern 
Provincial Security Committee (chaired 
by Benson Kaaria), Garissa District 
Committee and the Minister for Internal 
Security (G.G. Kariuki) at the time of the 
security operations bear responsibility for 
the operation and the ensuing atrocities. 
Wagalla Massacre: 
The Commission found that the security 
operation conducted in Wagalla, Wajir, in 
February 1984 resulted in the massacre 
of hundreds of civilians. Numerous other 
atrocities were committed by state security 
agents including torture, brutal beatings, 
rape and sexual violence, burning of houses 
and looting of property. The Commission 
found that the atrocities committed during 
the security operation qualified as crime 
against humanity. The Commission was 
unable to determine the precise number of 
persons killed in the massacre but found 
that a large number died, possible close to 
a thousand. As such, the official figure of 57 given by the state 
grossly underestimated the number of people killed at Wagalla and 
is an example of the generally thoughtless manner in which the state 
has traditionally treated massacres committed by its own agents. 
In relation to responsibility and accountability, the Commission 
found that the Wajir District Security Committee, North Eastern 
Provincial Security Committee, and Kenya Intelligence Committee 
bear various levels of responsibility for the 
operation and the ensuing massacre and 
atrocities. 
Malka Mari Massacre: 
The Commission found that the 1981 
security operation in Malka Mari, Mandera, 
resulted in the massacre of hundreds of 
individuals. During the security operation, 
women were raped and were subsequently 
shunned in the community. Others suffered 
serious injuries. The Commission found 
that the state has maintained an official 




found that the 
security operation 
conducted in West 
Pokot District, 
between 22 
February and 22 
May 1984 by state 
security agents 
(mainly the Kenya 
Army) resulted in 
the massacre of 
individuals. Numerous other atrocities were 
committed during the security operation 
including torture and sexual violence. 
The Commission has recommended the 
provision of reparation for families of victims 
of massacres and the establishment of 
memorials at the site of such massacres. 
The Commission has also recommended that individuals identified 
as been responsible for planning, authorizing and implementing 
of security operations that resulted in massacres be further 
investigated to detremine any criminal culpability on their part, if 
any, and that they should not hold public office in Kenya’s new 
constitutional dispensation. 
Political Assassinations 
Kenya has lost some of its best and 
brightest to political assassination:  Pio 
Gama Pinto, Tom Mboya, Josiah Mwangi 
Kariuki (popularly known as JM Kariuki), 
Robert Ouko, Father Antony Kaiser, 
Bishop Alexander Muge, and many others. 
A number of these deaths have been the 
subject of high profile investigations; in 
some cases they have been subject to 
repeated investigations. Yet despite all 
of the investigations in these and other 
similar cases, the uncertainty concerning 
who was responsible for the killings and 
why specific individuals were killed is often 
as unclear as it was on the day the body 
was found.  Given the failures of past 
investigations, the Commission was fully 
aware that solving any of the mysteries 
surrounding these deaths would be difficult 
and challenging.  
Nevertheless, the Commission gathered 
information, undertook research and 
investigations, and solicited testimony 
to understand the context in which such 
killings took place; the circumstances and thus probable causes of 
such killings; the impact of such killings, particularly on the family 
and friends of the victim; and the failure of investigations to solve the 
mystery of why a person was killed and who was responsible. The 
Commission’s work in relation to political assassinations confirms 
that the state was complicit in the assassination of Pio Gama Pinto, 
Tom Mboya,  and Josiah Mwangi Kariuki, Robert Ouko 
Pio Gama Pinto: 
The Commission found that the assassination of Pio Gama Pinto 
was motivated by ideological differences that were at the heart of 
the global Cold War but also mirrored in domestic Kenyan politics. 
The Commission further found that the arrest and prosecution of 
Kisilu, Chege Thuo, and a third unidentified man who dissappeared, 
was used to divert attention away from the the true motive and the 
more responsible perpetrators of Pinto’s assassination. Finally, 
Tom Mboya:
The Commission found that Tom Mboya was assassinated for his 
political beliefs and the perception that he posed a threat to the 
political establishment. The Commission 
did not receive any credible evidence 
refuting the involvement of Nahashon Isaac 
Njenga Njoroge in the assassination, but 
did receive sufficient evidence to find that 
Njoroge did not act alone. The Commission 
found that the circumstances sorrounding 
the assassination – including the political 
rivalvries he provoked and the failure of 
the government to investigate fully the 
assassination – point to the involvement 
of government officials in the killing and 
subsequent cover up. 
Josiah Mwangi Kariuki: 
The Commission found that JM Kariuki was 
assassinated for political reasons. Based on 
evidence, the Commission found that state 
officials, including members of the police and 
the Special Branch, were directly involved 
in the assassination of JM Kariuki. The 
Commission further found that government 
officials were involved in the cover up of the 
assassination and that President Kenyatta 
deliberately interfered in independent investigation undertaken 
by the Parliamentary Select Committee by, among other things, 
directly removing two names from the report because they worked 
in the Office of the President. 
Robert Ouko: 
The Commission found that Robert Ouko was assassinated and 
that government offcials were involved in his assassination and 
in the subsequent cover up. The Commission further found that 
individuals connected to the assassination of Ouko have died in 
mysterious circumstances and that the failure of the government 
to undertake credible investigations into these deaths is part of the 
official cover up. 
Crispin Odhiambo Mbai: 
The Commission found that Crispin Odhiambo Mbai was 
assassinated because of his political views related to his chairing 
of the Devolution Committee of the National Consitutional 
Conference. The Commission further found that the state is either 
unbale or unwilling to engage in a process that would shed light on 
the death of Dr. Mbai. 
Extrajudicial killings and enforced 
disappearances
The Commission found that throughout the mandate period, there 
was a common trend or pattern of state-sanctioned killings and 
disappearances. The use of execessive and dispropotionate 
force by the Kenyan police force has been a common theme 
running through Kenya’s history. The Commission found that 
during the mandate period, it was common for the police to 
summarily execute individuals who were suspected criminals or 
members of proscribed criminal gangs such as Mungiki and SLDF. 
Importantly, the Commission found that police killings and enfirced 
I could not even get water to give the 
children. I left them under a tree and 
went back, only to find that the father 
was among the people who were 
killed by the police. I witnessed his 
body been put in a car. They threw the 
dead body into the river. Men were in 
the field while women and children at 
home. The women were raped, girls 
were crying for help and no one could 
help them. 
Witness to Bulla Karatasi 
Massacre  
During that short period that we 
stood there, what I saw and what has 
remained very distinctly in mind today 
is a pile of bodies to my right and two 
naked people carrying yet another 
body to put on the pile. 
Witness to Wagalla Massacre 
I remember that Mr. Shikuku had 
warned us before we went to State 
House [to present the Report of the 
Parliamentary Select Committee  on 
the disappearance and death of JM 
Kariuki] because he refused to join us 
to go there. Even Mr. Seroney did not 
join us. He has told us: ‘It is better that 
you go a few of you because you may 
never return and if you do not return, 
we will tackle this issue outside here 
before we are also picked ...On the 
day of voting for the Report, Hon. 
Masinde Muliro who was a cabinet 
minister, and Hon. Peter Kibisu, who 
was an assistant minister, voted for the 
adoption of the report. In the evening 
or at around 6 pm, they had lost their 
positions in the Government. 
TJRC witness
Mzee Atoligole Losute became the 
first person to surrender his gun, but 
when he tried to raise the certificate, 
the helicopter dropped down and 
then he was told: because you are 
good person, we will take you round 
to be an example to other people 
... his wives saw him go inside the 
helicopter and after going round, 
he was seen hooked or tied on his 
neck to the helicopter and then he 
was flown off and went round [with] 
the helicopter and after 30 minutes, 
that old man died. He was thrown 
away at the border of Kenya and 
Uganda. 
 
Witness to Lotiriri Massacre 
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disappearances of members of Mungiki and SLDF could amount 
to crimes against humanity. Moreover, the Commission found that 
whenever the state has been faced with allegations of extra-judicial 
killings and/or disappearances, its traditional response has been 
to blatantly deny these allegations and attack the crediblity and 
legitimacy of those making the allegations, rather than investigate 
those allegations. 
The Commission has, amongth others, recommended the provision 
of reparation to families of victims of extra-judicial killings and 
enforced disappearances. 
Detention, torture and 
ill-treatment
In many ways, and despite the many challenges that it continues to 
face, Kenya is a country whose democratic 
and political space is relatively wide and 
dynamic. At least from 2003, the state has 
more often than not respected citizens’ 
freedom of expression, assembly and the 
right to association. However, it was not 
always this way. The freedom that Kenyans 
enjoy today is the result of many years of 
activism and struggle against dictatorship 
and state repression or violence. It is a 
freedom that came at a high price for 
many men and women who dared criticize 
or oppose Jomo Kenyatta’s and Daniel 
Arap Moi’s political administrations. 
Many of them were detained without trial, 
tortured, and subjected to inhuman and 
degrading treatment. Their families were 
equally subjected to untold sorrows by 
state operatives. Many others succumbed 
to torture or were killed after undergoing 
torture. 
Research and investigations conducted by the Commission 
coupled with the testimonies it received, shows that widespread 
and systematic use of torture occurred in the following contexts: 
• during the Shifta War; 
• in the aftermath of the 1982 attempted coup; 
• between 1982 and 1991 purposely to quell dissenting political 
voices and as part of the crackdown on Mwakenya; 
• between 1993 to 1997 as part of the crackdown on the February 
Eighteenth Revolutionary Army (FERA); 
• in 1997  following a raid on a police station in Likoni; and 
• most recently in 2008 during Operation Okoa Maisha, a security 
operation to flush out members of the  Sabaot Land Defence 
Force (SLDF) in the Mount Elgon region. 
On the basis of its research, investigations and hearings, the 
Commission has made, amongst others, the follwoing findings: 
• systematic use of torture was employed by the Special Branch 
during interrogations of detained persons in Nyayo House, 
Nyati House, police stations, prisons, and other locations.
• Nyayo House basement cells and the 24th, 25th and 26th floors 
were used for interrogations and torture after the attempted 
coup of 1982, during the Mwakenya crackdown, and the 
FERA/M crackdown, and that the state purposely designed and 
built  these places for torture purposes. 
• the State established a task force for the specific purpose of 
interrogation and torture of suspects. The Commission has 
recommended the prosecution of the members of the this task 
force. 
• the Judiciary frequently cooperated with the prosecution and 
security forces in the commitment of violations by refusing 
bail and by admitting evidence obtained through torture. The 
judiciary was also complicit in these violations to the extent that 
they conducted trials beyond working hours. 
To prevent the recurrence of torture, the Commission has 
recommended the enactment of legislation prohibiting all forms of 
torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment committed both by state and non-state actors. The 
Commission has also made the following recommendations:
• that the President offer a public apology to all victims of torture 
and unlawful detention and acknowledge the role of the state in 
the design and use of the Nyayo House torture cells for torture 
purposes
• that Nyayo House be converted into a memorial after 
consultation with victims of torture
• the establishment of the Office of the Independent Inspector 
of Prisons and All Places of Detention. This office shall be 
charged with the function of inspecting prison conditions and 
investigating allegations of torture. The Office shall also be 
mandated to investigate all cases of death in custody. The 
office shall issue periodic reports to the public on the condition 
of prisons in Kenya and other matters under its mandate.
The Commission has also recommended the provision of reparation 
for victims of unlawful detention, torture and ill-treatment as per the 
framework described in the Chapter on Reparation Framework.
Sexual violence 
Sexual violence is a crime that intimately 
impacts the victim both physically and 
psychologically. It uses the victim’s own 
sexual anatomy to dominate, suppress 
and control. For a long time, women and 
girls were believed to be the main, if not 
the only, victims of sexual violence. Over 
time, there has been acknowledgement 
that men and boys are also victims of 
sexual violence. 
The Commission received hundreds 
of statements from women, men and 
children outlining serious sexual violations 
perpetrated by individuals and groups of 
people including ordinary citizens and 
state officials. A total of 1,104 statements 
from adults were received in regard to 
sexual violations, representing a victim count of 2,646 women and 
346 men. The Commission acknowledges that due to shame and 
stigma associated with sexual violence, many victims of sexual 
violence did not report sexual violence to 
the Commission. 
Recognizing that sexual offences are 
ordinarily complex to investigate, the 
Commission adopted specific measures 
to ensure that sexual offences were 
effectively and sensitively investigated. 
Firstly, investigators who had previous 
experience in investigating sexual 
offences and who had undergone training 
on the same, including on the Sexual 
Offences Act, were recruited. Secondly, a 
set of guidelines outlining the approach to 
be taken in investigating sexual violence 
was prepared. The overall goal of the 
guidelines was to ensure that survivors of 
sexual violence were treated with dignity.
In acknowledgement of the stigma, 
shame and embarrassment associated with sexual violence, 
the Commission offered victims of sexual violence the option of 
testifying either in camera or in public. The idea was to provide 
victims of sexual violence with not only a platform to be heard, but 
also a safe environment in which they could share their experiences 
freely. The Commission also engaged the services of counsellors 
to offer psycho-social support before, during and after the hearings 
to enable the victims not only to narrate their experiences but also 
to cope with what they had experienced. 
The primary findings of the Commission in relation to sexual 
violence include the following: 
• sexual violence was committed throughout the mandate period, 
and included gang rapes, sodomy, defilement, sexual slavery, 
and other forms of sexual violence. The Commission found that 
sexual violence increased during times of conflict. 
• sexual violence against women was rampant during forceful 
evictions conducted by the state and/or its agents. In one 
particular case, the Commission received about 30 statements 
from women who were raped in Kitui during an eviction referred 
to as ‘Kavamba Operation’. 
• there is sufficient evidence implocating British soldiers for the 
rape and sexual violation of women in Samburu and Laikipia 
between the 1908s and early 2000. The Kenyan govrnment has 
neither committed to nor shown any political will to investigate 
allegations of rape and sexual violence committed by British 
soldiers stationed in Kenya for military training. 
• State security agents are responsible for the majority of cases 
of sexual violence committed during conflict in Kenya. 
In addition to recommending the provision of reparation for victims 
and survivors of sexual violence, the Commission has recommended 
the establishment of a gender violence recovery center in every 
county. Moreover, the Commission has recommended the setting 
up of the Office of the Special Rapporteur on Sexual Violnce as 
initially recommended by the Commission of Inquiry into the Post 
Election Violence. 
Land and conflict 
For the majority of Kenyans, land is the basic, and in most cases, the 
only economic resource from which they eke out a livelihood. The 
ability to access, own, use and control land has a profound impact 
on their ability to feed and provide for their families and to establish 
their socio-economic and political standing in society. However, 
tensions and structural conflicts related to land have simmered in 
all parts of Kenya throughout the years of independence. In recent 
years, many land related problems have degenerated into social 
unrest and violence. 
Illegal acquisition of large tracts of land from indigenous communities 
during the colonial period rendered many communities at the Coast 
and in mainland Kenya landless. While affected communities 
expected redress through re-settlement, restoration of their land 
and compensation from the Kenyatta and subsequent post-
independence administrations, the government, instead alienated 
more land from already affected communities for the benefit of 
politically privileged ethnic communities and the political elite. This 
led to deeply held resentments against specific ethnic communities 
who benefited from resettlement at the 
expense of those who believe they are 
the rightful owners of the land.
The Commission confirmed that land has 
been and remains one of the major causes 
of intra and inter-ethnic conflicts in the 
country. However, addressing historical 
and post-independence land injustices 
has not been genuinely prioritized by 
successive governments despite the 
critical importance of land to the country’s 
economic development. There has never 
been any sustained effort to address 
land injustices that have occurred since 
colonial times.
The Akiwumi Commission of Inquiry 
established in 1998 to look into the ethnic 
clashes related to the 1997 General 
Election vividly demonstrated how the skewed land allocation and 
ownership has fuelled ethnic tension and led to violent conflicts 
throughout Kenya and particularly in the Rift Valley and Coast 
regions. During the mandate period, land-related grievances led to 
the emergence of militia groups in some parts of the country. The 
stated  aims of these militia groups often relates to the reclamation 
of lands, and the removal by violent means, of current occupants 
who they claim rendered them squatters. The Sabaot, for example, 
took up arms in 2006 in the Mount Elgon region to reclaim what 
they consider to be their land. 
Politicians often exploit the real or perceived land injustices 
especially around election time, for personal gain. The dangerous 
mix of land-related claims with political aspirations of specific 
groups or individuals remains a tinderbox that could ignite at any 
time. 
The Commission found that the ‘willing-buyer, willing-seller’ land 
tenure approach was grossly abused and is one of the major 
factors causing disinheritance and landlessness, especially in the 
face of rising human populations. 
“ Have you ever had your genitals tied 
and forced to make you diarrhoea? I 
told him that has never happened to 
me and he told me “ You are a very 
young person. Do you have any 
children?” I told him no, I was still a 
young boy. So, he told me: “ If you 
have ever had any children, then 
there  is no hope of you ever having 
children.” 
TJRC Witness 
Before we started the session, the 
National Anthem was sung. I want to 
tell you that we have never been part 
of the National Anthem. The National 
Anthem talks of justice, fellowship, 
awareness, good life, abundance, 
among other things. These things 
have never been experienced in this 
region [Northern Kenya]. In totality, I 
can say that we have never been part 
of this country
TJRC witness
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The unresolved land injustices have led to discriminatory and 
exclusionary practices that work against nationhood. The increasing 
feeling among the long-disadvantaged pastoral communities and 
the Kalenjin in particular (both herders and farmers) that they 
should fight at all cost to reclaim their ‘stolen’ land from the rich 
‘foreign’ (non-Kalenjin) settlers is one example. Although no attempt 
was made by President Moi’s government to revoke the land 
settlements of President Kenyatta’s regime, it became increasingly 
difficult for ‘non-indigenous’ people to buy land north of Nakuru. 
Non-Kalenjin individuals and groups who bought parcels of land in 
Kalenjin-dominated areas found it hard to get them demarcated or 
obtain title deeds.
Negative ethnicity appears to be reflected even in the settlement 
of internally displaced persons; those who get resettled often come 
from communities able to access political power. 
The litany of historical injustices relating to land involves a complex 
variety of permutations. Almost every type of public land was 
affected: from forest land, to water catchments, public school 
playgrounds, road reserves, research farms, public trust lands 
and land owned by public corporations and private individuals. 
Perpetrators of the injustices were equally varied and include 
holders of public office and government leaders at every level, 
the political and economic elite, church organisations, individuals 
and communities. Those who held sway usurped the institutions of 
government to their bidding including the legislature, the executive 
and the judiciary. 
Officials who were supposed act as custodians of public land under 
the public trust doctrine, became the facilitators of illegal allocation, 
increasing landlessness and land scarcity. The practice of land 
grabbing in many cases resulted in violence, as squatters resisted 
eviction from government land that was often subsequently lost to 
land grabbers. State corporations became conduits for ‘get-rich-
schemes’ in which public lands were transferred to individuals and 
then quickly bought off at exorbitant prices by state corporations.
Economic marginalisation and violation of 
socio-economic rights
The TJR Act mandated the Commission 
to ‘inquire into and establish the reality 
or otherwise of perceived economic 
marginalisation of communities and make 
recommendations on how to address the 
marginalisation’. 
Evidence shows that while the majority 
of Kenyans may not have been detained 
without trial or subjected to torture and other physical integrity 
violations, government’s exclusionary economic policies and 
practices in the distribution of public jobs and services inflicted 
suffering on huge sections of society at different historical moments. 
As the Commission traveled the country receiving statements and 
conducting public hearings, the pervasiveness of socio-economic 
violations was evident. 
In terms of its mandate, the Commission identified a number of 
regions as economically marginalised in the post-independence 
era:
• North Eastern (including Upper Eastern) Province; 
• Nyanza;
• North Rift; 
• Coast; 
• Western Province. 
Although poverty was found to be prevalent all over the country it was 
disproportionately so in these marginalised areas. By definition the 
Commission noted that marginalisation involves direct and indirect 
discrimination in the distribution of social goods and services. The 
economically marginalised also tend to be marginalised culturally, 
socially and politically. The Commission found that in almost all 
cases, the state played a direct role in increasing or decreasing 
inequality in communities. 
The Commission experienced a challenge in getting reliable and 
quality data, particularly on state funding of social programmes and 
infrastructure over the years in regions identified as marginalised. 
In making its assessment the Commission used a number of 
indicators of marginalisation including physical infrastructure, 
employment (especially in the public sector), education, health, 
housing, access to land, water, sanitation and food security. 
Although Central, Nairobi, South Rift Valley and Lower Eastern 
provinces were not profiled as economically marginalized regions, 
this does not mean that poverty is not evident in these regions. In 
fact, some residents of these regions also considered themselves 
marginalised at one time or another. 
Other examples of marginalisation include narratives from within 
specific regions based on local rather than national forces. 
In Nyanza, the Kuria blamed their plight on the Luo and the 
Abagusii, while in Nyandarua the residents considered themselves 
marginalised by their neighbours within the region. In the Western 
region, Bungoma and Vihiga were seen as beneficiaries of the 
limited social goods through co-option of individuals by the Moi 
regime. Co-option of leaders from the region often camouflaged 
the reality of marginalisation giving the sense of political inclusion 
that did not necessarily translate to economic inclusion. 
Marginalisation has been used  deliberately as a political tool to 
punish recalcitrant politicians by punishing their ethnic group or 
religion.
The 1966 fallout between Jomo Kenyatta and Jaramogi Oginga 
Odinga was the beginning of the disintegration of the Kikuyu-Luo 
alliance, which was at the core of KANU at independence. It marked 
the start of the marginalisation of Nyanza and the first blatant use 
of negative ethnicity at a political level. Later similar disagreements 
between Raila Odinga and Mwai Kibaki led to the blacklisting 
of Luo Nyanza both in terms of access to capital development 
and appointments to public positions. Testimony before the 
Commission suggested that Nyanza had been in the economic and 
political cold for all but 10 years since independence. This isolation 
increased poverty and left various social and economic problems 
unaddressed. 
In the case of North Eastern Province, 
employment, land, infrastructure, poverty, 
education and the institutional framework 
and capacity were the key indicators of the 
marginalisation of the region. One of the greatest 
impediments to development of the region is 
the lack of land registries in the region. As for 
infrastructure, which includes public utilities 
and is a major determinant of development 
and progress, the 
region has no tarmac road except the 
Isiolo-Moyale road, which is still under 
construction. The region has the highest 
rural population living under the poverty 
line at 70 percent, compared to 32 percent 
for Central province. Lack of food security 
is compounded by the erratic and low 
rainfall and declining pastures and other 
resources. This in turn creates conflict 
over these resources, further depleting 
the limited resources and the livestock. 
The paucity of schools and their relatively 
prohibitive cost in an area of widespread 
poverty has affected access to the limited 
education opportunities. School enrolment 
stands at about 18 percent for primary 
schools and 4.5 percent for secondary 
schools compared to the national 
average of about 88 percent and 22 per 
cent for primary and secondary schools 
respectively. Service delivery for health, 
water and sanitation were also way below 
the national average figures.
The face of marginalisation was found 
to be different in diverse regions. The 
relatively fertile land and security of 
Western province tended to underplay 
the indicators and perceptions of 
marginalisation. While marginalisation has 
not reached the extent of that in North Eastern or Nyanza, Western 
was found to be forgotten in the development agenda with cash 
crops and related industries (cotton, sugarcane, rice and fisheries) 
completely ignored or badly mismanaged when compared to those 
of other regions. 
The North Rift Valley region was found to have been marginalised 
from colonial times through to the present. Insecurity, a harsh 
climate and regular inter ethnic and cross border conflict make the 
region difficult to live in. Absence of security personnel has led to 
a localised small arms race as groups accumulate arms to protect 
themselves. Successive governments maintained the same closed 
area policies as the colonialists preventing interaction with the rest 
of the country effectively marginalising the region. Indicators for 
education, health, infrastructure, water, housing and sanitation 
were dismal compared to the rest of the country. Only one hospital 
serves the six districts of Turkana.
Landlessness is the major indicator of marginalisation at the Coast; 
land is the most intractable of the problems because of its historical 
origins. The original local inhabitants were dispossessed of their 
land, first by the colonialists, and later by fraudulent transactions 
that again ignored the original owners of the land. This left most 
of the land in the 10-mile Coastal Strip in the hands of absentee 
landlords. After independence, the dispossession of the local people 
was confirmed and certified instead of being rectified, which led 
to a palpable sense of a conspiracy against coastal communities 
orchestrated by people from up-country. 
Hearings of the Commission were dominated by this problem. 
The most affected areas were Taita Taveta, Lamu, Malindi and 
Tana River counties. The Coast lags behind in terms of almost all 
indicators from infrastructure to health, education, housing, water 
and sanitation. The region also exhibits gender marginalisation 
attributed to religious and cultural dynamics of the locale. Rural 
areas are served by dilapidated road networks compared to 
Mombasa, Kilifi, Malindi and Kwale. 
Grand corruption and economic crimes 
The fight against corruption is central to the struggle for human 
rights. Corruption has always greased the wheels of exploitation 
and injustice which characterize our world. As such, corruption is 
not just a crime that provides an undeserved benefit to a private 
individual (often an enormously large such benefit), it is a crime 
that lessens the availability and access to the fundamental needs 
of human life:  food, education, health care, shelter, etc.  In other 
words, the crime of corruption is directly related to the violations of 
socio-economic rights. 
While corruption violates the rights 
of all those affected by it, it has a 
disproportionate impact on people who 
belong to vulnerable groups. Examples of 
these are minorities, indigenous people, 
persons with disabilities, persons living 
with HIV/AIDS, refugees, prisoners, the 
poor, women and children. They are 
more exploited and less able to defend 
themselves. Their vulnerability makes 
them easy victims of corruption.
Kenya’s post- independence history has 
been marred by successive cases of 
huge scandals. In order to appreciate the 
magnitude and scale of grand corruption 
in Kenya, the Commission resorted to 
documented cases of grand corruption 
from as early as the KenRen scandal in 
the 1970s up to the IEBC’s procurement of 
biometric voter registration kits in 2013. In 
the last two decades, the media and civil 
society exposed numerous multimillion 
dollar financial scams in Kenya including 
the following: Ken Ren Scandal; 
Goldenberg Scandal; Charter House Bank 
Scandal; and Anglo Leasing Scandal. 
In its Chapter on Grand Corruption 
and Economic Crimes, the TJRC  has 
Marginalisation has been used 
deliberately as a political tool to 
punish recalcitrant politicians by 
punishing their ethnic group or 
region.
As we travel to Kenya, we face the 
strict burden of proof that we are, 
indeed, Kenyans. If the four of us 
were to travel in the same vehicle, 
the presumption would be that 
the rest are all Kenyans, but I am 
a foreigner. So, at the numerous 
roadblocks which are lined up all the 
way from here to Isiolo where Kenya 
starts, I have to produce my identity 
card, in default of which I would 
face severe consequences. This 
scenario does not stop in Isiolo. In 
our own country, I feel the indignity 
of being stopped at a public office 
and being subjected to security and 
other checks simply because from 
my looks, I am a dangerous person 
or a terrorist. This is the kind of pain 
we have been living in since Kenya 
attained its independence
TJRC witness 
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demonstrated the linkages between these crimes and the 
enjoyment of human rights and the huge cost that Kenya is paying 
through corruption and economic crimes. 
Women
Men and women experience violations 
of human rights and injustices differently. 
Building on the provisions of the TJR Act, 
the Commission adopted policies and took 
measures that ensured that the experiences 
of and violations suffered by women were 
appropriately and comprehensively covered 
both in its work and this Report. These policies 
and measures related to the Commission’s 
statement-taking process, hearings, focus 
group discussions, and other activities 
undertaken by the Commission. 
Perhaps most importantly, the Commission held separate hearings 
for women in order to encourage women to speak about their own 
experiences. The women’s hearings were framed as ‘conversations 
with women’. They were presided over by female Commissioners 
and staff, and were thus designed to be safe spaces where women 
could freely talk about violations that were specific to them. The 
women’s hearings were conducted in all regions of the country. In 
total, over 1000 women attended the women’s hearings across the 
country, with an average of 60 women in each hearing. 
The Commission’s chapter on gender deliberately focuses on 
the various injustices that women faced during the mandate 
period. Although women have always constituted half  of Kenya’s 
population, they have been traditionally relegated to a subordinate 
status by patriachal cultural norms and practices. Harmful 
traditional practices in Kenya include, amongst others, preference 
for male children, early or forced marriages, wife beating, female 
genital mutilation and widow inheritance. These norms were 
standard and sanctioned by law in the greater period covered by 
the Commission’s mandate. As such the Commission has found 
that women were the subject of systematic discrimination and/or 
gender-based persecution throughout the mandate period. 
An important finding made by the Commission is that in situations 
of conflict women are specific targets of violence, particulalrly 
sexual violence which is often accompanied by other forms of 
vioaltions. The Commission has documented atrocities committed 
against women during the following three selected conflicts: Mau 
Mau War; Mount Elgon conflict and the 2007/2008 Post-Election 
Violence. 
Conflicts always result in the forced displacement of populations. 
The Commission’s hearings revealed that the state’s response 
to the plight and needs of internally displaced women was less 
than satisfactory. Generally, the state’s response fell short of its 
obligations as stipulated in relevant human 
rights instruments. 
Although most women who testified before 
the Commission were victims of displacement 
occasioned by the 2007/2008 PEV, many 
of them had been victims of prior evictions 
and displacement. During the PEV, women 
suffered violations during flight to the camps 
or to places where they hoped they would 
find refuge. On resettlement of IDPs under 
Operation Rudi Nyumbani, the Commission’s 
hearings revealed that the corruption and 
mismanagement which marred the entire 
process had a particularly devastating impact 
on women. A considerable number of displaced women told the 
Commission that they received neither the start-up capital nor the 
payment in lieu of housing. 
Kenyan refugee women in Uganda face a peculiar problem. During 
their women’s hearings, it became evident that many women found 
themselves in a dilemma as to whether they should return to Kenya 
or not. While some women were willing to return, their husbands 
were not. As such, they could not return to Kenya without straining 
or breaking their marriages. The general feeling among the Kenyan 
refugees in Uganda is that of a people who have been neglected 
and abandoned by their government. 
Kenyan women were also victims of state repression during the 
mandate period. As primary victims of state repression, scores 
of women, especially politicians, academics or human rights 
activists, were targets of state violence 
both during Presidents’ Kenyatta and 
Moi’s administrations. A number of female 
members of parliament who were vocal in 
their opposition to repressive rule would be 
subjected to trumped-up charges, detained, 
or even tortured. The vast majority of 
women were however secondary victims 
of state repression. Many women were 
widowed after their husbands were killed 
in security operations or died in police 
custody after undergoing torture. Some 
were subsequently thrown into destitution 
since husbands are the main breadwinners 
in many households in Kenya. Those whose husbands or sons 
were detained faced similar fate
In summary, women have suffered terrible atrocities just because 
of their sex and gender. The Commission has documented these 
atrocities not only for historical purposes, but also as a bold 
statement to political leaders and policy makers that achieving a 
just and fair Kenya partly depends on the initiatives they will take to 
heal the soul of the Kenyan woman. At present, the vast majority of 
women feel abandoned by the state. Although in recent years many 
reforms have taken place to ensure women’s empowerment, much 
more still needs to be done for these reforms to make substantive 
and real contributions in the lives of women. There is need for 
special attention to the most vulnerable among women: women 
in rural and slum areas, internally displaced and refugee women, 
women with disabilities, women living with 
HIV/Aids and women belonging to minority 
and indigenous groups. 
Children
Children occupy a special place in any effort 
to understand the impact of gross human 
rights violations and historical injustices. 
Children are, on the one hand, some of the 
most vulnerable people in a community and 
as such are less able to defend themselves 
against those who would do them harm, and 
are more likely to suffer both short- and long-
term effects from gross violations of human 
rights.  At the same time, children are the 
future of the country.  Their experiences of 
their community, of their peers, of officials, 
and of other people in authority have 
profound impacts on their future, including 
how they trust, or 
don’t trust, those in 
authority.  In addition, experience throughout 
the world confirms that children who are 
themselves the victims of abuse are more 
likely themselves to be abusers of others 
when they become adults.  Some, as the 
Commission discovered, were both victims 
and perpetrators while still under the age of 
eighteen; being forced, for example, to join 
a militia and then committing violations as a 
member of that militia.  
Thus, while the mandate of the Commission 
did not have a child-specific focus, the 
Commission made deliberate efforts to facilitate participation of 
children and young people in its proceedings and to ensure that 
their interests and views both as direct and indirect witnesses and 
victims of human rights violations were captured. The Commission 
designed child-friendly processes to promote the participation 
and protection of children. Most notably, the Commission held a 
thematic hearing in Nairobi that included an opportunity for children 
to testify in their own words in an environment that was safe and 
supportive.
The Commission heard horrific and heart-rending stories of abuse, 
violence, and other gross violations of the rights of children. The 
Commission also heard the anger of some of these children – 
some going so far as to say they wanted to kill the people who 
had abused them.  As such, the Children’s Chapter provides a 
cautionary tale for the future of the nation.  The roots of tomorrow’s 
conflicts and violations are found in part in the treatment of our 
children today.
Minority groups and indigenous people
Testimony before the Commission clearly indicated that the rights 
of minorities and indigenous people have been violated repeatedly 
since independence. The problem is systemic. 
Many oppressive laws sanctioned the collective punishment 
of minority and indigenous communities. While the laws were 
supposed to apply across the country, in practice they only applied 
to communities in northern Kenya where a significant number of 
minority groups and indigenous people are to be found. The anti-
stock theft law, for instance, legalised the collective punishment 
of a community for the offences of individual members of that 
community.
Witness testimony before the Commission showed minorities 
and indigenous peoples routinely had their collective identity 
marginalised. National data classified them as ‘others’ creating 
deep-seated feelings of exclusion among groups such as the 
Munyoyoya, Nubians, Suba,Waata, Ogiek, Sabaot, Kuria, Kona, 
Bajuni, Hara, Saakuye, Burji, Isaak and Sengwen whose existence 
was effectively denied by the state and unknown to the majority of 
Kenyans. Yet the right to identity is important  as it is associated 
with several others, such as the right to culture. 
The forced displacement of pastoralists and 
hunter-gatherers from their ancestral lands 
further  increased their marginalisation, 
deepened their poverty and created conflict 
with neighbours. For instance, the Endorois 
were brutally evicted from the trust land 
they inhabited around Lake Bogoria when 
the government declared the area a game 
reserve. They were displaced, lost property 
and denied access to traditional cultural and 
religious areas.  
The small population size that characterises 
minorities and indigenous groups, has denied 
them influence and left them out of policy 
and decision making – even where decisions 
directly affect them.  During the mandate 
period, minority groups and indigenous 
people were unable to access justice at 
many levels frustrating their efforts to protect 
other rights. Minority and indigenous women 
suffered multiple forms of discrimination. They bore the brunt of 
inter-ethnic conflicts and insecurity and had difficulty accessing 
social services and goods from education to health services. 
The 2010 constitution has several provisions aimed at securing 
an efficient legal framework for the protection and promotion of 
the rights of minorities and indigenous people. However, it needs 
statutory and institutional mechanisms for the realisation of these 
objectives. 
Ethnic tension 
The Chapter on Ethnic Tension documents the main causes 
and effects of ethnic tension in Kenya and is based mainly on 
testimonies that the Commission heard during its hearings 
countrywide. In addition to holding such hearings, the Commission 
also organized a thematic hearing on ethnic tension and violence 
on 2 February 2012 in Nairobi, received presentations by experts 
and relevant institutions such as the National Cohesion and 
Integration Commission (NCIC). 
Through its research and hearings, TJRC identified several causes 
and drivers of ethnic tension in the country. The roots of most of these 
causes are traceable to the practices of colonial administration. 
Is it a crime to be born a woman? 
What I have gone through is 
likely to affect my daughter. Will 
there be justice for women and 
the girl child in this country? That 
is my biggest concern. 
TJRC Witness 
I would like to tell the Government 
to help us children because we 
did not vote or were not voted 
for. Therefore, we did not have 
any issues. The adults are the 
ones who had issues. 
TJRC child witness 
My daughter has three children 
but she still does not have an ID 
Card although she has a waiting 
letter. All our Somali children in 
Naivasha do not have ID cards 
but they have all grown up 
here. There is even a 50-year-
old  woman who has not been 
given an ID card. We are not at a 
border such that they can say we 
crossed from another country. 
This is open discrimination. 
TJRC witness 
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Firstly, the Colonial government pursued 
a policy of ‘divide and rule’ in order to 
consolidate their hold on the country, and 
to lessen the possibility that the African 
population would resist colonial rule. To 
that end, they magnified the differences 
between the various communities and 
regions, and stereotyped each community 
in a manner that would sow suspicion, 
hatred and create a sense of ‘otherness’. 
Secondly, the Colonial government 
created ethnically defined administrative 
boundaries. In determining such 
boundaries, little serious thought, if 
any, was given to historical inter-ethnic 
interactions and relations. Thirdly, the 
colonial government focused on developing 
infrastructure and social services in productive areas of the country 
(the so called ‘white highlands’) at the expense of the rest of the 
country.  The resulting inequality remained largely unaddressed in 
the policies and practices of independent Kenya. The preferential 
treatment given to some areas of the country because of their clear 
productivity thus led to differential treatment of ethnic communities 
that were patterned around the ethnic enclaves created by the 
colonial government. 
Fourthly, the colonial land policy, particularly in the so-called 
‘white highlands’ contributed enormously to regional and ethnic 
marginalisation from the economy. Colonial land policies resulted 
in displacement, the creation of ‘native reserves’, as well as 
the movement of masses of people from areas of their habitual 
residence to completely different regions and settling them on 
lands that traditionally belonged to other communities.  
Thus, Kenya entered the era of independence with a heightened 
sense of ethnicity that continued to divide rather than unite the 
country. However, the  ruling elite in independent Kenya did not 
have the political will or commitment to create a truly democratic 
and prosperous Kenya for all its citizens.  The result was the 
worsening of ethnic relations such that by 2007, long standing 
grievances erupted into unprecedented violence. 
In the post-independence period, causes of ethnic tension include 
the following: 
• Insider/Outsider dynamics: Ethnic tension and violence occur 
when communities assert a superior claim over a territory at the 
expense of or to the exclusion of others. Such superior claims 
are based on the assumption that ownership or occupation 
at some point in the past created an exclusive claim for such 
ownership or occupation in the present. Such exclusive claims 
to territory inevitably create classes of ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’. 
This perception of people as outsiders as opposed to fellow 
citizens often leads to increased tension based on ethnicity 
which, in turn, creates the potential for ethnic violence.
• Of names and their meaning: In Coast and Rift Valley alike, 
a prickly issue that is intricately tied to the notion of insiders 
and outsiders, relates to names of places. In particular, local 
communities in these two regions are aggrieved that places 
occupied by those they consider outsiders have been given 
‘outside names’.
• State sanctions of outside/insider notions: The designation of 
a community as ‘other’ or as an outsider has sometimes found 
support in state policy. In the northern region of the country, 
particularly in those areas that made up the former North 
Eastern Province, the Government has institutionalised the 
disparate treatment of Kenyans based on ethnicity by requiring 
that Kenyans of Somali origin carry a special pass.
• Negative perceptions and stereotypes: Negative perceptions 
and stereotypes are a major cause of ethnic tension in the 
country. Certain communities have been labelled, portraying 
them in broad, often negative terms that generalise certain traits 
and apply them to all individuals belonging to the described 
community, regardless of how individuals perceive themselves. 
For example, the Kikuyu are sometimes described as thieves, 
the Maasai as primitive, the Somali as terrorists..
• Culture and stereotypes: While the Colonial government 
played an important role in cultivating ethnic stereotypes, the 
Commission also received evidence that 
some stereotypes are drawn from and 
driven by traditional cultural beliefs and 
practices. For instance, the Commission 
heard that men from communities that 
do not practice male circumcision have 
always been stigmatised and regarded 
as lesser or weaker men, and therefore, 
incapable of or unsuitable to take 
political leadership of the country.
• Ethnicity and access to public office: 
The perception that ethnic representation 
in government results in direct economic 
and other benefits to the represented 
community, is pervasive in Kenya. While 
the Commission acquired evidence 
that such benefits do not necessarily 
accrue to those communities who 
are represented - even in the highest offices of the land - the 
perception that they do leads to intense competition for such 
representation, and thus increases the likelihood of violence 
during elections. 
To demonstrate the complicated mix of land, ethnicity, politics and 
violence, the Commission includes an analysis of ethnic violence 
in the Mt. Elgon region. While the history of violence in Mt. Elgon 
is unique, many aspects of the causes of violence and its impact 
are typical in many other parts of the country.  The Commission 
found that the emergence of SLDF in the Mt. Elgon region was 
precipitated largely by government failure to fully address land-
related injustices that members of Sabaot community have 
suffered since the colonial period. The Commission found that 
both the SLDF and the Kenya Police and Army were responsible 
for gross violations of human rights including killings, enforced 
disappearances, torture and sexual violence. 
Reconciliation 
For decades, Kenya has remained a nation in 
which communities stand divided along ethnic 
and regional lines suspicious and distrustful 
of one another. Over the decades feelings 
of inter-communities distrust, even hatred, 
have festered mainly because a myriad of 
issues which are at the core of nation building 
have largely remained unresolved. These 
issues include conflicts over land, inequality 
and regional imbalances, and impunity 
combined with a lack of transparency and 
accountability. These issues have eroded a 
sense of belonging, nationhood, and public 
trust in political and governance institutions. 
Since independence, successive governments have employed 
silence, denial and selective amnesia whenever individuals and 
agencies have raised the need to address these fundamental 
issues. Painful memories have been passed from one generation 
to another and as a consequence, present generations continue to 
hold grudges for violations and historical injustices meted against 
their forefathers and mothers. Until now, the scale and impact of 
human rights violations and historical injustices have neither been 
fully acknowledged nor sufficiently addressed.
In its work, the Commission recognised that meaningful 
reconciliation is not an event, but rather a long process. At the 
individual level,  the decision to reconcile is a personal one, aimed 
at setting the stage and establishing the basis for the beginning 
of a reconciliation process. Accordingly, the Commission worked 
towards ensuring that its activities in the course of its life and the 
result of its work would substantially contribute to the process of 
reconciliation.
As part of its reconciliation activities, the Commission conducted 
reconciliation workshops across the country. It also conducted 
Workshops on Trauma Healing and Strategy Formulation in 
selected places in the country. Painful memories have been passed 
from one generation to another, and as a consequence, present 
generations continue to hold grudges for violations and historical 
injustices meted against their forefathers and mothers. Until now, 
the scale and impact of human rights violations and historical 
injustices have neither been fully acknowledged nor sufficiently 
addressed.
The Commission found that the views of victims on reconciliation 
are varied. There are those who willingly forgave their perpetrators 
and did not even need to meet them. There are those who simply 
wanted to know why atrocities were committed against them. But 
there are also those who were unwilling to forgive and wanted to 
see their perpetrators prosecuted for the wrongs they committed. 
Adversely mentioned persons, on the other hand, were largely 
unwilling to acknowledge any responsibility for events that resulted 
in unspeakable atrocities. 
Implementation mechanism 
Past experiences with the work of truth commissions and 
commissions of inquiry around the world have shown that a major 
challenge lies in the implementation of the recommendations 
contained in the reports of these commissions. More often than 
not, the life of these commissions ends at the point of submission 
of their final report, leaving the implementation to other actors 
who often do not follow through with the recommendations. This 
challenge has also characterized the work of many commissions 
of inquiry in Kenya in the past.
The consequences of this challenge have been to limit the impact of 
the work of these commissions and to contribute to public fatigue and 
disappointment about such commissions after expectations were 
raised. The drafters of the TJR Act must have had this challenge 
in mind when they empowered the Commission to recommend 
an implementation mechanism to ensure its recommendations 
were duly and timely implemented, and to monitor progress in that 
implementation. The government is expressly obligated under the 
TJR Act to create the implementation mechanism as set out in this 
Report.  
The Commission was sensitive to balancing 
a number of important objectives in its 
recommendation for an implementation 
mechanism. First, it is imperative that the 
Commission’s Report, the result of close to 
four years of work, be widely disseminated 
and accessible to the Kenyan public, and in 
particular to the thousands of Kenyans who 
directly participated in and contributed to the 
Commission’s work. 
Second, it is imperative that the Commission’s 
recommendations, including but not limited 
to recommendations related to reparations, be fully implemented. 
Third, given the importance of many of the recommendations 
of the Commission, including the recommendations related to 
reparations, the Commission realized that the implementation 
mechanism would need to be independent of those bodies to 
which such recommendations are directed in order to monitor 
them effectively.  In addition, the Commission was concerned 
that the implementation mechanism be sufficiently resourced in 
terms of time and staff to ensure effective monitoring and that its 
recommendations were in fact implemented.  
Based upon these and other considerations, the Commission 
decided to recommend  the establishment of a Committee for the 
Implementation of the Recommendations of the Truth, Justice and 
Reconciliation Commission (the “Implementation Committee’). The 
Implementation Committee shall be established by legislation. 
Reparation Framework 
The TJR Act required the Commission to make recommendations 
with regard to the policy that should be followed or measures 
that should be taken with regard to the granting of reparation to 
victims or the taking of other measures aimed at rehabilitating and 
restoring the human and civil dignity of victims. In this regard, the 
Commission has recommeded the establishment of a reparation 
fund that shall be used to compensate victims of gross violation of 
human rights and historical injustices. The Reparation Framework 
recommended by the Commission sets out the caterories of victims 
who would access the fund and the criteria for such access. 
We must work from the basis that 
Kenya is a garment of many colours, 
which is beautiful because each 
colour is present. We cannot be one 
colour because we would be dull. 
Some colours cannot run over others 
because we would be ugly. We must 
all stay in place and be bright. That 
is an ideal situation of where Kenya 
ought to be.
TJRC witness
The Commission recognised 
that meaningful reconciliation is 
not an event, but rather a long 
process and that the decision to 
reconcile is a personal decision, 
aimed at setting the stage and 
establishing the basis for the 
beginning of a reconciliation 
process. 
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Theme/Subject Recommendations Responsibility for implementation Timeline
1 Atrocities committed 
during colonial era 
Acknowledgment and apology British government  
Negotiation for compensation from the British government Kenyan government and British government  12 months 
2 Shifta War Acknowledgment and apology President and Chief of Defence Forces  6 months 
Repeal of Indemnity Act Attorney General and Parliament 9 months 
Publication and dissemination of the 1967 Arusha Agreement between 
Kenya and Somalia 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs/Office of the President 9 months 
Establishment of a public memorial Implementation Mechanism/Ministry responsible 
for National Heritage/National Museum 
24 months 
3 Massacres Acknowledgment and apology President, Inspector General of Police and Chief of 
Defence Forces  
6 months 
Reparation for victims and survivors Implementation Mechanism 36 months 
Release of all minutes of the relevant District Security Committees, 
Provincial Security Committee, Kenya Intelligence Committee and 
National Security Council 
President/Office of the President  6 months 
Establishment of memorials at the sites of massacres Implementation mechanism/Ministry responsible 
for National Heritage/National Museum  
24 months 
Return of Father Adrian Joseph Janito for purposes of giving testimony 
on Bubisa Massacre 
Catholic Church 
4 Political assassinations Acknowledgment and apology President 6 months 
Release of all reports and materials of all previous investigations of 
political  assassinations 
President/Office of the President 6 months 
Further investigations relating to the assassination of JM Kariuki, Robert 
Ouko, Crispin Odhiambo-Mbai and Father Antony Kaiser 
Director of Public Prosecutions 18 months 
Further investigation of the assassination of Father Antony Kaiser Director of Public Prosecutions to appoint 
independent investigator(s) 
18 months 
Establishment of public memorials Implementation Mechanism/ministry responsible 
for national heritage/National Museum 
24 months 
5 Extra-judicial killings Acknowledgment and apology President, Inspector General of Police and Chief of 
Defence Forces  
6 months 
Ratification of International Convention for the Protection of All Persons 
from Enforced Disappearance
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 24 months 
Fast-tracking of reforms in the Police Service, including introduction of 
new standard operating procedures on the use of force
Inspector General of Police and Police Service 
Commission 
Establishment of a fully equipped modern national forensic laboratory Ministry responsible for internal security and other 
relevant ministries/institutions 
36 months  
Establishment of fully equipped modern forensic laboratories in each 
county 
Ministry responsible for internal security and other 
relevant ministries/institutions 
36 months 
Abolition of the death penalty and commuting of all death penalties to 
life imprisonment 
Attorney General and Parliament 24 months 
Reparation for victims and survivors Implementation mechanism 36 months 
6 Unlawful detention, 
torture and ill-treatment 
Acknowledgment and apology President 3 months 
Enactment of legislation prohibiting torture Attorney General and Parliament 12 months 
Legislation on and establishment of the Office of the Independent 
Inspector of Prisons and All Places of Detention 
Attorney General and Parliament 12 months 
Prosecution of individuals involved in torture and ill-treatment Director of Public Prosecutions 18 months 
Designation of Nyayo House as memorial for victims of detention and 
torture 
Implementation mechanism/Ministry responsible 
for National Heritage/National Museum 
12 months 
Reparation for victims and survivors Implementation mechanism 36 months 
7 Sexual violence Acknowledgment and apology President, Inspector General of Police and Chief of 
Defence Forces, and British government 
6 months 
Negotiation for compensation (in relation to victims and survivors of 
sexual violence committed by British soldiers in Laikipia and Samburu) 
Kenyan government and British government 
Establishment of one-stop gender recovery centers for provision of 
comprehensive services to victims and survivors of sexual violence, 
including medical, counseling and legal services 
Relevant government ministries, departments 
and bodies including: Ministry of Health; Ministry 
of Justice; Director of Public Prosecutions; Police 
Service; NGEC; etc. 
Legislation on and establishment of the Office of the Special Rapporteur 
on Sexual Violence 
Attorney General and Parliament 12 months
Fast-tracking of the establishment of a sexual offenders registry Chief Registrar of the Judiciary 12 months 
Reparation for victims and survivors Implementation Mechanism 36 months 
8 Access to justice Fast-tracking of the establishment of the International Crimes Division 
of the High Court 
Chief Justice 12 months 
Fast-tracking of establishment of a nationwide legal aid system Ministry of Justice/National Legal Aid (And 
Awareness) Programme in Kenya (NALEAP) 
18 months 
Declaration under article 34(6) of the Protocol to the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of the African Court 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 12 months 
Issuance of a public report on the progress of investigations and 
prosecution of 2007/2008 post-election related violence 
Director of Public Prosecutions 3 months (and in 3 months intervals 
thereafter) 
Annex: Recommendations and Implementation Matrix 
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Annex: Recommendations and Implementation Matrix 
Theme/Subject Recommendations Responsibility for implementation Timeline
Fast-tracking of enactment of human rights related laws as envisaged 
by the Constitution of Kenya: 
Legislation on freedom of the media (section 34)§	
Legislation on fair hearing (section 50)§	
Legislation on the rights of persons detained, held in custody or §	
detained (section 51)
9 Women Acknowledgment and apology President 3 months 
Stepping up of measures to raise awareness about harmful cultural 
practices 
Equality and Gender Commission 
Enactment of relevant laws (e.g. marriage; matrimonial property; family 
protection/domestic violence)
Attorney General and Parliament 18 months 
Adoption and implementation of a Plan of Action to increase and 
improve maternal health facilities and measures to reduce delivery at 
home
Ministry of Health 12 months 
10 Children Acknowledgment and apology President 6 months 
Psychosocial counseling for children victims of atrocities Implementation Mechanism and relevant 
government departments/institutions 
Reparation for children victims of atrocities and injustices Implementation Mechanism 36 months 
Reorganization of Borstal institutions to fall under the Department of 
Children’s Services 
Office of the President 12 months 
Adequate funding of the Department of Children’s Services Ministry of Finance Continuous 
Robust plan for Integration of children with disabilities in mainstream 
educational facilities 
Ministry of Education 12 months 
11 Minority groups and 
indigenous people 
Acknowledgment and apology President 6 months 
Implementation of decisions relating to minority/indigenous 
communities: 
Decision of the African Commission on Human and §	
Peoples’ Rights in Communication No. 276/2003 Center for 
Minority Rights Development (Kenya) & Minority Rights Group 
International (on behalf of Endorois Welfare Council) v Kenya
Decision of the African Committee of Experts on the Rights §	
and Welfare of the Child in Communication No. 002/09 IHRDA 
& OSJI (on behalf of children of Nubian descent in Kenya) v Kenya
Decision of the High Court of Kenya in §	 Charles Lekuyen Nabori 
& 9 Others v Attorney General and 3 Others [Petition No. 466 of 
2006, High Court at Nairobi]
Various relevant ministries and institutions 12 months 
Ratification of relevant treaties:
ILO Convention 169 §	
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime §	
of Genocide
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant §	
Workers and Members of Their Families
Convention Against Discrimination in Education§	
Statelessness Conventions§	
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 24 months  
Fast-tracking of legislation on as envisaged by section 100 of the 
Constitution of Kenya 
Attorney General, Constitutional Implementation 
Committee, and National Gender and Equality 
Commission 
Review of all legislation to eliminate de jure and de facto discrimination 
against minority/indigenous communities 
Kenya Law Reform Commission and National 
Gender and Equality Commission 
6 months 
Development and implementation of a plan on data collection on 
minority and indigenous communities 
Kenya Bureau of Statistics and Ministry of National 
Planning 
Implementation of the recommendations of the Presidential Special 
Action Committee to Address Specific Concerns of the Muslim 
Community in Regard to Alleged Harassment and/or Discrimination in 
the Application/Enforcement of the Law





Formulation, adoption and implementation of a policy on the economic 
development of marginalized regions identified by the Commission 
Focus: 




Relevant Ministries and institutions including 
Ministry for Finance, Ministry of Health, Ministry of 
Education, Commission on Revenue Allocation, etc. 
12 months 
Collective reparation for communities in marginalized regions identified 
by the Commission 
Implementation mechanism and relevant state 
ministries and institutions 
36 months 
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Theme/Subject Recommendations Responsibility for implementation Timeline
13 Land Further investigations of alleged illegal or irregular acquisition of land National Land Commission 
Survey, demarcation and registration of public land 
Adjudication and registration of land at the Coast and other areas 
where this has not been done 
National Land Commission 
Development and maintenance of a computerized inventory of all land Ministry of Lands and National Land Commission 
Reparation for historical land injustices Implementation Mechanism and National Land 
Commission 
36 months 
14 Economic Crimes and 
Grand Corruption 
Harmonization of the various laws relating to combating economic 
crimes and grand corruption 
Attorney General and Parliament 18 months 
Domestic criminalization of certain offences stipulated in the UN 
Convention Against Corruption  
Attorney General and Parliament 18 months 
Expansion of the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (from 3 to 9 
commissioners)
Attorney General and Parliament 18 months 
Fast-tracking of investigations of corruption cases which have remained 
unresolved for many years 
EACC 18 months 
Clarification of ‘integrity test’ EACC 6 months 
15 Ethnic tension and 
reconciliation 
National Reconciliation Conference/Day President/Implementation Mechanism/NCIC/NSC 6 months 
Investigation and prosecution of all adversely mentioned persons in 
official reports on political instigated ethnic violence or clashes 
Director of Public Prosecutions 
Audit of institutions and mechanism involved in peacebuilding, 
reconciliation and early warning with a view to harmonizing their 
activities and adopting a coordinated approach.
Joint Task Force of the NCIC, NSC and CSOs/CBOs 6 months 
Comprehensive and sustained nation-wide community dialogues NCIC and National Steering Committee on 
Peacebuilding and Conflict Management (NSC)
Continuous 
16 Mt. Elgon conflict Acknowledgment and apology President/Inspector General of Police/Chief of 
Defence Forces  
6 months 
Establishment of a counseling and healing center Implementation Mechanism and relevant 
government ministries/institutions 
12 months 
Establishment of a memorial for victims and survivors Implementation mechanism/Ministry responsible 
for National Heritage/National Museum
36 months 
Reparation for victims and survivors Implementation Mechanism 36 months 
Exhumation and reburial Implementation Mechanism and relevant 
government ministry/institution
36 months 
Prosecution of individuals alleged to have been involved in the 
planning, financing and instigating violence and other atrocities 
Director of Public Prosecutions 18 months 
Prosecution of army commander in charge of Operation Okoa Maisha Director of Public Prosecutions 18 months 
17 Forced displacement Facilitation and resettlement of Kenyan refugees in Uganda who are 
willing to return to Kenya 
Relevant Government Ministry/Department 
responsible for matters relating to internal 
displacement.
18 months 
Fast-tracking of the operationalisation of the Prevention, Protection and 
Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons and Affected Communities 
Act, No. 56 of 2012
Relevant Government Ministry/Department 
responsible for matters relating to internal 
displacement.
6 months 
Audit and registration of all IDPs who did not benefit from Operation 
Rudi Nyumbani with a particular focus on integrated IDPs
Implementation  Mechanism and National 
Consultative Coordination Committee on Internally 
Displaced Persons
12 months
Reparation for IDPs and refugees Implementation Mechanism 36 months 
Ratification of the African Union Convention for the Protection and 
Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 24 months 
18 Reports of commissions 
of inquiry 
Release of reports of previous commission of inquiries and related 
bodies: 
Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the 1992 Raid on §	
Bishop Gitari’s House in Kirinyaga 
Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Conduct of the §	
Artur Brothers and their Associates (‘Kiruki Report’)
Report of the Presidential Action Committee to Address §	
Specific Concerns of the Muslim Community in Regard to 
Harrassment and/or Discrimination in the Application and 
Enforcement of the Law (‘Sharawe Report’)
President 6 months 
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